College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Popular Media

Faculty and Deans

2015

Are Legal Restrictions On Disparaging Personal
Names Unconstitutional? In re The Slants
Laura A. Heymann
William & Mary Law School, laheym@wm.edu

Eric Goldman

Repository Citation
Heymann, Laura A. and Goldman, Eric, "Are Legal Restrictions On Disparaging Personal Names Unconstitutional? In re The Slants"
(2015). Popular Media. 392.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media/392

Copyright c 2015 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media

2/412016

~e

Legal Restrictions On Disparaging Personal Nemes Unconstitulional?-ln re The Slants (Guest Blog Post)

TECHNOLOGY
& MARKETING
LAWBLOG
Menu
Browse: Home » 2015 » December » Are Legal Restrictions
On Disparaging Personal Names Unconstitutional?-In re
The Slants (Guest Blog Post)

Are Legal Restrictions On
Disparaging Personal
Names Unconstitutional?In re The Slants (Guest
Blog Post)
December

23, 2015 ·

by Eric Goldman· in Trademark

By Guest Blogger Laura Heymann
[Eric's introduction: Prof. Heymann has spent more
time thinking about the Law of Naming People and
Things than anyone else I know. I asked her to
weigh in on the potential implications of the Federal
Circuit's Tam decision (The Slants decision) for
restrictions on personal names. Her thoughts:]
The Federal
Circuit's
decision inln

reSimon
Shicro Tam will, no doubt, be the subject of much
commentary in the weeks to come. As readers have
no doubt already learned, the majority held that the
portion ohs U.S.C. § 2(a)-thatprohibits the
registration of a trademark if it "may disparage ...
persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt or
disrepute"-is facially unconstitutional under the
First Amendment
hllp://blog.ericgolchlan.orglarchives/2015112/are-legal-restrictions-oo-disparaging-personal-ncmes-~tutional-in-re-the-slants-g.Jest-blog-post.htm
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Tam had sought to register THE SLANTS as the
trademark for his Asian American rock band in an
attempt to "reclaim" the word, and it was this
expressive function of trademarks that led the
majority (and for Judge Dyk, as applied to Tam's
case) to hold that regulation on the basis of the
mark's meaning could not be justified.
I'll leave it to others to explore the implications of
the court's holding for other areas of trademark law,
including the additional section 2(a) prohibitions
that are not based on deception or confusion, as well
as trademark defenses such as descriptive fair use.
For now, I want to highlight the ways in which the
Federal Circuit's holding can have equal application
to courts' consideration of personal name change
petitions.
(Personal names are not the only area potentially
implicated by the Federal Circuit's reasoning:
Consider, for example, 46 C.F.R § 67.117, part of
the Vessel Documentation Act of 1980, which
prohibits names that "contain [or are] phonetically
identical to obscene, indecent, or profane language,
or to racial or ethnic epithets.")
As I've discussed previously on this blog and
elsewhere (Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law),
personal names have at least three functions. A
name's denotative function allows us to refer. A
name's connotative function is what makes naming
a creative act - it allows the namer to suggest
gender, class, religious or historical connections, or
other characteristics. Naming is in this way also a
demonstration ofpower, as in when a nickname or
disparaging group name is given to another. And a
name also has an associative function in that it
signals a connection to a group or family.
As with trademarks, no official recognition is
required to establish a name- use and adoption by
others is what validates a name. And so when courts
are petitioned for official recognition, many will
claim- as the PTO has typically done with
trademarks -that the process is largely ministerial,
and that the only role that the court should play is to
hllp://blog.ericgolchlan.orglarchives/2015112/are-legal-restrictions-oo-disparaging-personal-ncmes-~tutional-in-re-the-slants-g.Jest-blog-post.htm
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ensure that the name change won't cause fraud or
deception.
In the past, however, some courts have grappled
with their unease at being asked to register a name
that is offensive or otherwise objectionable and have
used the discretion granted to them by statute to
deny such petitions. A California court affirmed in
1992 a lower court's denial of a petitioner's request

to change his name to a racial epithet because, in
part, it concluded that granting the request would be
seen as "promoting racial disharmony." Similarly, a
New Mexico court in 2008 affirmed a lower court's
denial of request to change the petitioner's name to
"[F***J Censorship!"

As the Federal Circuit has now confirmed, however,
these decisions should be seen as unconstitutional.
As with trademark registration, a court's approval of

a name change petition isn't itself government
speech or otherwise an imprimatur; accordingly, to
approve some requests and deny others based on the
meaning of the proposed name constitutes viewpoint
discrimination.
It's true that reported decisions denying name
change petitions appear to be waning. Judges have
become more accustomed to the fluidity of identity
over time and to the desire to have one's name reflect
that identity. But some petitioners may never get to
the courtroom, discouraged by court websites that
continue to tell applicants that they cannot petition
for a name that is "bizarre, unduly lengthy,
ridiculous, or offensive," as both theNew York state
court system's website and the Utah state court
system's website do. (This is simply a different
version ofwhatElizabeth Emens described as "deskclerk law. ") The Federal Circuit's opinion may
inspire those courts to take a fresh look at how the
information they provide shapes the public's
understanding of the FirstAmendment

Eric's Comments:
*The Federal Circuit is often castigated as an IP
hllp://blog.ericgolchlan.orglarchives/2015112/are-legal-restrictions-oo-disparaging-personal-ncmes-~tutional-in-re-the-slants-g.Jest-blog-post.htm
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maximalist court, so it's tempting to dismiss this
ruling as just the Federal Circuit once again
expanding trademark's boundaries to greenlight
more trademark registrations. Perhaps an IP
maximalist impulse steered the majority in that
direction, but I see this ruling as actually a really
savvy pro-free speech ruling. Can the government
deny government benefits to prevent
"disparagement''? No, that clearly would be a
government effort to suppress socially disfavored
speech, and the Federal Circuit fully recognized the
law's censorious implications. I'm especially
impressed that the court wasn't phased by the
venerability of this decades-old statute.

* Historically, the Patent Office denied patents on
the grounds that the inventions were immoral (a
paradigmatic example was gambling machines).
That moralistic streak died out decades ago, for good
reason. Preserving morality isn't a proper
government function, and the government never will
do a good job implementing such amorphous
standards. I see this ruling as wiping out the
analogous principles in trademark law. (The court
makes it clear that it isn't opining on the statutory
restrictions against registering scandalous or
immoral marks, though I think the court's logic
should apply equally to those statutory terms).

* I'm sure judges aren't looking forward to the
coming legal battles over trademarks using
indelicate terms. It's hard to maintain judicial
decorum when socially disfavored phrases shows up
dozens of times in each partYs brief.
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